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- CEO Compensation🔍
- Are CEOs in U.S. Public Firms Overpaid? New Evidence from ...🔍
- Powerful CEOs and Stock Price Crash Risk🔍
- Evidence from credit risk around CEO turnovers🔍
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- Performance effects of the incentive explicitness in CEO compensation🔍
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
vikram nanda - Google Scholar
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? A Morse, V Nanda, A Seru. The Journal of Finance 66 (5), 1779-1821, 2011. 598, 2011. Internal capital markets ...
CEO Compensation and Cash-Flow Shocks
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful ceos? Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1779–1821. Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of ...
CEO Compensation: Agency Theory is Irrelevant but not ... - HAL-SHS
Actually, asymmetry of information cannot be tackled by an incentive contract offered to the CEO. ... Are Incentive contracts Rigged by Powerful ...
vikram nanda - Google Scholar
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? A Morse, V Nanda, A Seru. The Journal of Finance 66 (5), 1779-1821, 2011. 600, 2011. Internal capital markets ...
Are CEOs in U.S. Public Firms Overpaid? New Evidence from ...
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance 56, 1779-1821. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration ...
Powerful CEOs and Stock Price Crash Risk
Our results complement prior findings that powerful CEOs rig incentive pay (Morse ... Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance 66(5) ...
Evidence from credit risk around CEO turnovers - Pace University
incentive contracts because powerful CEOs manipulate the weights on ... Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful. CEOs? The Journal of Finance, 66 ...
Journal of Financial. Economics 68, 233-262. Morse, A., Nanda, V., Seru, A., 2011. Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance 66, 1779- ...
Performance effects of the incentive explicitness in CEO compensation
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? J. Financ. 66, 1779–1821. Nyberg, A.J., Fulmer, I.S., Gerhart, B., Carpenter, M.A., 2010 ...
Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance
Since powerful CEOs have a strong incentive for empire building, they could retain free ... Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance, ...
Executive Compensation and Real Earnings Management
13:4-15. Morse A, Nanda V, Seru A (2011) Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? The Journal of Finance.66:1779-1821 ...
Corporate spinoffs and executive compensation
Accordingly, firms will have greater incentives to design CEO compensation contracts ... Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal ...
Do powerful CEOs affect qualitative financial disclosure? Evidence ...
Morse, Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs ?, J. Financ., № 66, с. 1779 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.x; Neel, Accounting ...
CEO Long-Term Incentive Pay in Mergers and Acquisitions
find powerful CEOs rig their incentive contracts. Malmendier ... incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of. Finance,. 66 ...
Ownership Concentration and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance 56, 1779-1821. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration ...
Optimal CEO Incentive Contracts: A Prospect Theory Explanation
Abstract. This study examines the relationship between CEO incentive-based compensation and firm performance, based on the role of prospect theory in ...
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer | Copenhagen Economics
“Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by. Powerful CEOs?”Journal of Finance 66 (5): 1779–1821. Murphy, Kevin J. 1985. “Corporate Performance and ...
Amit Seru - Google Scholar
Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? A Morse, V Nanda, A Seru. The Journal of Finance 66 (5), 1779-1821, 2011. 600, 2011. Fund manager use of public ...
Do Powerful CEOs Make Efficient Investment Decisions?
components: CEO duality, CEO pay slice, dependent executives, CEO only insider, stock ... "Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs ?" The Journal of.
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence - EconStor
imply that incentive contracts are worse than no incentive contract. ... Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? J. Financ. 66 (5) ...