- voluntary incentive mechanism for biodiversity protection on farmland🔍
- Optimal Incentives with State‐Dependent Preferences🔍
- Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting🔍
- 5 5 The Incentive‐Compatibility Desideratum🔍
- An Incentive|Aligned Mechanism for Conjoint Analysis🔍
- Essays in Mechanism Design and Game Theory with Applications🔍
- Fat|tail Climate Risks🔍
- Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms🔍
Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
voluntary incentive mechanism for biodiversity protection on farmland
“Social preferences and public economics: mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives”, Journal of Public Economics 92 (8–9):.
Optimal Incentives with State‐Dependent Preferences - HWANG
A parsimonious explanation is that incentives that appeal to self-regarding economic motives may crowd out noneconomic motives such as altruism, ...
Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting
There are several agents, whose preferences depend on a state of nature. The ... Decentralization, hierarchies, and incentives: A mechanism design perspective.
5 5 The Incentive‐Compatibility Desideratum - Oxford Academic
... depends crucially on the individuals' preferences, not just on the social mechanism. ... design of organizations and social mechanisms. The literature on ...
An Incentive-Aligned Mechanism for Conjoint Analysis - Sage Journals
The mechanism requires only one real product variation and has truth telling in conjoint as its Bayesian Nash equilibrium, thus making it possible to incentive ...
Essays in Mechanism Design and Game Theory with Applications
converge to the full social preferences environment (ρ decreases) and there is no need to relax the incentive compatibility constraints. This leads to a ...
Fat-tail Climate Risks, Mechanism design, and Reputation
Design When Social Preferences Depend on Incentives”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 92 (8-9), 1811-1820. owles, S. 2008), “Policies ...
Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms
preferences the strength of social incentives in our framework is endogenous, depend- ... social norms make the optimal design of economic incentives.
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives - PubsOnLine
Two principal results are demonstrated. The first is that no matching procedure exists which always yields a stable outcome and gives players the incentive to ...
Belief Elicitation and Behavioral Incentive Compatibility - Economics
1 Recent design efforts have therefore aimed to find elicitations that make truth telling theoretically incentive compatible for a broader set of preferences.
Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy
One way to measure the quality of equilibria is via the. “price of anarchy”—how much worse the social welfare can be in an equilibrium outcome, as opposed to ...
When Economic Incentives Backfire - Harvard Business Review
Reprint: F0903A Economic incentives become counterproductive when they undermine what Adam Smith called “the moral sentiments,” such as the desire to be ...
Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction - EliScholar
In contrast to optimal or revenue maximizing mechanisms, the dynamic pivot mechanism does not rely on strong assumptions about commitment or ...
munication without commitment), when the sender's preferences do not depend ... and incentive compatible mechanism, as in the canonical game in Section 3.2.
Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences∗ - CMR
a mechanism must not depend on specific ... social preference model so that incentive-compatibility and externality-freeness are necessary.
[PDF] Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information.
Mechanism Design: Recent Developments∗
In quasi-linear environments, incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the social surplus are payoff-equivalent to dominant strategy (VCG) ...
Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory - jstor
plan for how social decisions should depend on people's reported information, and changing the ... incentives in social institutions. Our theoretical framework ...
Behavioral drivers or economic incentives? Toward a better ...
Social preferences and voting: An exploration using a novel preference revealing mechanism. ... contingent valuation: Mechanism design and ...
Social Dilemmas: The Role of Incentives, Norms and Institutions
We find both that conditional cooperation and free-riding are the most common cooperation preferences and that they are stable at different endowment ...