[PDF] Compensation Rigging by Powerful CEOs

Compensation Rigging by Powerful CEOs: A Reply and Cross ...

We find strong evidence that rigging only occurs in powerful-CEO firms by conducting a series of tests which assess sensitivity of compensation to Max using ...

[PDF] Compensation Rigging by Powerful CEOs: A Reply and Cross ...

Wan (2013) argues that the statistical inferences in our Journal of Finance (2011) paper are not robust, as we do not prove that it is powerful CEOs that ...

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged By Powerful CEOs?

Rigging accounts for at least 10% of the sensitivity of compensation to performance measures and is increasing in CEO human capital and volatility of a firm's ...

Compensation Rigging by Powerful CEOs: A Reply and Cross ...

Wan (2013) argues that the statistical inferences in our Journal of Finance (2011) paper are not robust, as we do not prove that it is powerful ...

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?

The model delivers an explicit structural form for the rigging of CEO incentive pay along with testable implications that rigging is ...

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? | Request PDF

The model delivers an explicit structural form for the rigging of CEO incentive pay along with testable implications that rigging is expected to (1) increase ...

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? | Request PDF

Using U.S. data, we find support for the model's predictions: rigging accounts for at least 10% of the compensation to performance sensitivity ...

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs? - MORSE - 2011

We argue that some powerful CEOs induce boards to shift the weight on performance measures toward the better performing measures, thereby rigging incentive pay.

Incentive Contracts are not Rigged by Powerful CEOs

These firms should be broken out, because the MNS theory is not about newly-hired CEOs as new CEOs could not have rigged a previously-set compensation. Third, ...

Incentive Contracts are not Rigged by Powerful CEOs - now publishers

Morse et al. (2011), henceforth MNS, interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs ex post change their incentive contracts to put ...

文章详细信息

Incentive Contracts are not Rigged by Powerful CEOs ... DOI: 10.1561/104.00000016. Keywords: CEO compensation;Rigging;Stock options;Repricing ... PDF全文返回 ...

Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? J. Financ. 66 (5), 1779–1821. Mortensen, D.T., 1986. Job search and labor market analysis. In: Ashenfelter ...

Powerful CEOs and Corporate Governance

& Welch, 2000)), powerful CEOs will be less motivated to pay dividends because they would be less ... Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of ...

Does CEO compensation reflect managerial ability or managerial ...

Prior research finds that powerful CEOs receive a compensation premium; that is, the level of total compensation is higher for more-powerful CEOs than for less- ...

Regulating CEO Pay: Evidence from the Nonprofit Revitalization Act

... rigged by powerful. CEOs?, Journal of Finance 66, 1779–1821. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999, Executive compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics 3, 2485–. 2563. , and ...

CEO Compensation that Benefits Shareholders - Strathprints

... Rigged by Powerful CEOs?',. Journal of Finance, Vol. 66. No. 5, pp. 1779-1821. Murphy, K., (1999) 'Executive Compensation', In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card ...

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer - Scholars at Harvard

ative to total pay across the top-five executives is linked to lower ... “Are Incentive Contracts Rigged By Powerful. CEOs?” Journal of Finance 66 (5): ...

Pay for Performance? CEO Compensation Alignment Post-SEC ...

Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful CEOs? Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1779-1821. Murphy, K. J. 2013. Executive compensation: Where we ...

CEO Compensation and Cash-Flow Shocks

Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful ceos? Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1779–1821. Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of ...

CEO Incentive Compensation in U.S. Financial Institutions

(2011), “Are incentive contracts rigged by powerful. CEOs?” Journal of Finance, 66 (5), 1779–1821. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract ...