13 One|sided Matchings

13 One-sided Matchings: House Allocation Problems - Cornell CS

In this chapter, mirroring our treatment of voting, we revisit the matching market problem in a setting without money transfers.

One-Sided Matching Markets (DRAFT: Not for distribution)

We next define the fundamental cooperative game theoretic solution concept of core. Definition 13. A allocation µ of houses to all agents is said to be in the ...

The notion of popularity was introduced by Gärdenfors [13] who showed that every stable matching is popular. So popular matchings always exist ...

On a Conjecture by Gale a One-Sided Matching Problems

A mixed matching m is a lottery over pure matchings, m = ... It is clear that more work needs to be done on this subject. Page 13. ONE-SIDED MATCHING PROBLEMS.

A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching - arXiv

(N × {j}),. 12. Page 13. and let qS = qj if S = N × {j} for some j ∈ O, and qS = 1 for all other S ∈ H. A probabilistic assignment X is then ...

Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings - Computer Science

While the role of partial preferences has been well-explored in the sister problem known as two-sided matching [RCIL13; LMPS14], in which agents are matched to ...

If there is no stable matching in H without these edges then we use the lattice structure on stable matchings [13] to show that G has no fully popular matching.

Optimal Matchings with One-Sided Preferences: Fixed and Cost ...

Systems (AAMAS 2022), Online, May 9–13, 2022, IFAAMAS, 9 pages. 1 INTRODUCTION. In this paper, we consider the many-to-one bipartite matching prob- lem ...

Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings

Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings. Hadi Hosseini,1 Vijay Menon,2 ... 13: update Pi by adding object o at position |Pi|+1. 14: end for. 15: end if.

Introduction to Matching Problems - econ.umd.edu

• Two-sided matching: one to one, many to one. • One-sided matching markets ... Page 13. Lecture title. Vincent. Outline. Examples of matching problems ...

algorithms - Matching with One-sided Preferences

Here are two different algorithms for solving the problem. The first uses a greedy approach. Order the elements of A arbitrarily: A=a1,…,an. Let ...

Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems

A matching assigns each agent either an agent of the opposite gender or the option of being unmatched. Each agent has a strict ordering over agents of the ...

Dynamic One-Sided Matching - Search eLibrary :: SSRN

Dynamic One-Sided Matching. 62 Pages Posted: 13 Feb 2023 Last revised: 31 Oct 2024. See all articles by Antonio Nicolò · Antonio Nicolò.

Matchings under One-Sided Preferences with Soft Quotas - IJCAI

We study the many-to-one bipartite matching problem where we have a bipartite graph G = (A∪P,E) of applicants A and posts P in the presence of preferences of ...

Social welfare in one-sided matchings: Random priority and beyond

13 pages. Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). ACM classes: J.4; I.2.11. Cite as: arXiv:1403.1508 [cs.GT]. (or arXiv:1403.1508v2 ...

Social Welfare in One-Sided Matching Markets without Money

seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [13], see [24,25,2] for detailed surveys. The one-sided matching market design problem was first studied by Hylland and.

Stable marriage problem - Wikipedia

A matching is a bijection from the elements of one set to the elements of the other set. A matching is not stable if: There is an element A of the first matched ...

Stable Matchings with One-Sided Ties and Approximate Popularity

It was shown in [13] that G always admits a matching with unpopularity factor O(log n) and there are non-bipartite instances with strict rankings where every ...

13. R.M. McCutchen. The least-unpopularity-factor and least-unpopularity-margin criteria for matching problems with one-sided preferences. In Proceedings of ...

Two-Sided Matching with (Almost) One-Sided Preferences† - jstor

matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually ... 13 Nevertheless, we do not need to consider the whole market. Our main.