Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections

[2008.08451] Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections - arXiv

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates.

Axioms for defeat in democratic elections - Eric Pacuit

The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow's famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant. Alternatives(IIA).WecallthisweakeningCoherentIIA.

Axioms for defeat in democratic elections - Sage Journals

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates.

Axioms for defeat in democratic elections - IDEAS/RePEc

Downloadable! We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates.

Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections - PhilPapers

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are ...

Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections - IDEAS/RePEc

Downloadable! We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates.

Axioms for defeat in democratic elections - Sage Journals

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are ...

The profile σ(P ′ ). | Download Scientific Diagram - ResearchGate

We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are ...

Arrow's impossibility theorem - Wikipedia

Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result in social choice theory, showing that no ranking-based decision rule can satisfy the requirements of rational ...

Journal of Theoretical Politics

States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states' willingness to ratify the treaty.

Summary of Condorcet's paradoxes | Download Table - ResearchGate

The paradox may pose real problems to democratic decision making such as decision deadlocks and democratic paralysis. However, its relevance has been discussed ...

An axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle | CoLab

AbstractA number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (J ...

7 Strategic Axioms for the Anxious Progressive Voter

Learn how to make a strategic voting decisions in the upcoming election by understanding the role of elections in social change.

Wesley H. Holliday - Social Choice

Proposed Voting Methods. Stable Voting. with Eric Pacuit. 2023. Constitutional Political Economy.

[PDF] An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives

May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method ...

Independence of irrelevant alternatives before Arrow - ScienceDirect

Independence of irrelevant alternatives, as a criterion for evaluating choice and/or ordering rules, was introduced in the modern literature by Huntington ( ...

Wesley H. Holliday - Papers - UC Berkeley Philosophy

Papers · Social Choice and Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Possibility Semantics for Modal Logic · Modal and Non-classical Logic · Duality Theory.

(PDF) An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle - Academia.edu

A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (Journal of Theoretical ...

Social Choice Theory and Machine Learning Lecture 2 - Eric Pacuit

A voting method satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality and Reinforcement,. Faithfulness, and Cancels Properly if and only if F is Borda. F cancels ...

An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives - PhilPapers

May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method ...