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CEO Incentive Contracts


CEO Incentives—It's Not How Much You Pay, But How

On average, CEOs receive about 50% of their base pay in the form of bonuses. Yet these “bonuses” don't generate big fluctuations in CEO compensation. A ...

A Guide to CEO Compensation - Investopedia

CEOs often receive base salaries well over $1 million. In other words, the CEO is rewarded substantially when the company does well. However, the CEO is also ...

CEO compensation: Creating a strategic package to stand out in ...

CEO compensation is the total amount the CEO earns in exchange for doing their job. While CEOs receive an annual salary, their total ...

CEO Incentive Contracts, Monitoring Costs, and Corporate ...

executive officer (CEO) has received a pay raise of over 300 percent.1 This glaring contrast has sparked a flood of papers analyzing. CEO compensation contracts ...

Optimal CEO Incentive Contracts: A Prospect Theory Explanation

CEO Incentives Compensation Firm Performance. How to Cite. Optimal CEO Incentive Contracts: A Prospect Theory Explanation. (2014). Journal of Business ...

The Implications of Complexity in CEO Pay Packages

Compensation committees use these features to fine-tune incentives, but we argue that the resulting contracts can become so complicated that ...

Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts*

We use this new available data to study the terms of performance-based awards in CEO compensation contracts in S&P 500 firms.

Complexity of CEO compensation packages - ScienceDirect.com

First, we are the first paper to develop an empirical measure of compensation complexity. Second, we empirically document that CEO compensation ...

CEO Incentives for Risk-Taking and Compensation Duration

I. INTRODUCTION · In constructing CEO compensation contracts, boards of directors consider the incentives that arise from the horizon (duration) of the equity ...

Corporate Culture Homogeneity and Top Executive Incentive Design

Corporate Culture Homogeneity and Top Executive Incentive Design: Evidence from CEO Compensation Contracts. Posted by Dennis Campbell (Harvard ...

Research reveals the dark side of CEO incentive-based pay

Managing or manipulating reported performance is what the Olin Business School co-authors call the “dark side” of executive incentive contracts.

CEO incentives for risk-taking and compensation duration

We hypothesize that corporate boards structure CEO compensation contracts to offset contrasting managerial incentives from compensation risk ...

Are Incentive Contracts Rigged By Powerful CEOs?

The intuition is developed in a simple model in which some powerful CEOs exploit superior information and lack of transparency in compensation contracts to ...

CEO incentive contracts, monitoring costs, and corporate performance

One of the main justifications for the extraordinary pay of top CEOs is that they receive contracts that link CEO compensation to the performance of the firm.

CEO compensation complexity: Optimal contracts or agency ...

Current performance-based incentive plans include many of these practices and thus are consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis that ...

CEO Compensation Contracting for Distressed Firms

In the context of CEO compensation contracts, Balsam, Gu and Mao (2018) use a regression discontinuity (RD) approach and find that creditor influence after ...

CEO compensation: Evidence from the field - ScienceDirect.com

This paper anonymously surveys non-executive directors and institutional investors on how they set or influence pay.

Corporate Culture Homogeneity and Top Executive Incentive Design

features of CEO incentive contracts, such as the bonus, salary, and total pay as well as the use of non-financial performance metrics ...

Core Earnings Incentive Contracts and Classification Shifting

CEO compensation contracts increasingly include performance metrics based on core profitability. We predict and find that firms are more likely ...

Dynamic CEO Compensation - Harvard University

Keywords: Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent prob- lem, private saving, myopia, short-termism, vesting. JEL Classification ...