Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks - Stanford University

Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available ...

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks - kyle woodward

COLLUSION WITH PERSISTENT COST SHOCKS. By Susan Athey and Kyle Bagwell1. We consider a dynamic Bertrand game in which prices are publicly observed and each ...

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks - Athey - 2008 - Econometrica

When serial correlation of costs is imperfect, partial productive efficiency is optimal. For the case of two cost types, first-best collusion is ...

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks - Columbia Business School

Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available ...

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks - Wiley Online Library

Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available ...

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks

We show that when costs are perfectly correlated over time within a firm, if the distribution of costs is log-concave and firms are sufficiently patient, then ...

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks PRELIMINARY DRAFT-DO ...

Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available ...

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks - IDEAS/RePEc

Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available ...

Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks | Request PDF - ResearchGate

Although cost shocks are independent across firms, within a firm costs follow a first-order Markov process. We analyze the set of collusive equilibria available ...

Supplement to ``Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

by giving a firm zero profits forever (as in the belief threat punishment dis- cussed below), any such equilibrium must have prices less than or ...

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks - EconPapers

Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks ... This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title. ... Bibliographic data for ...

Collusion Under Persistent Shocks | Semantic Scholar

We study a repeated Cournot competition model where prices are determined not only by ﬁrms' quantities but also unobservable market shocks (Green and Porter ...

Asymmetric Pricing Caused by Collusion - De Gruyter

In many markets, empirical evidence suggests that positive production cost shocks tend to be transmitted more quickly and fully to final ...

Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit ...

Collusion Along the Learning Curve: Theory and Evidence from the ...

“Collusion with persistent cost shocks.” Econometrica,. 76(3): 493–540. Bernheim, Douglas, and Michael D. Whinston. 1990. “Multimarket ...

Asymmetric Pricing Caused by Collusion - De Gruyter

patient or negative cost shocks become more persistent, negative cost shocks are transmitted more quickly to final prices, even when ...

Regulating Collusion - Annual Reviews

... S, Bagwell K. 2008.. Collusion with persistent cost shocks. . Econometrica 76:(3):493–540. [Google Scholar]. Autor D, Dorn D, Katz LF, Patterson C, Van Reenen ...

Tacit collusion in repeated auctions - ScienceDirect.com

Collusion better than bid rotation is still feasible, but full surplus cannot be extracted. This constraint becomes less severe with more players and large ...

Collusion with Private Information and Fixed Costs - Royal Holloway

... cost shocks are independent across firms, but within a firm cost shocks ... [5] Athey, Susan and Bagwell, Kyle (2008): “Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks”,.

(PDF) Asymmetric Pricing Caused by Collusion - ResearchGate

In many markets, empirical evidence suggests that positive production cost shocks tend to be transmitted more quickly and fully to final ...