- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring🔍
- Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and Private Monitoring🔍
- [PDF] Collusion enforcement with private information and private ...🔍
- Optimal collusion with private information🔍
- Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels🔍
- Private monitoring🔍
- Maintaining Privacy in Cartels🔍
- Private Monitoring🔍
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Inspired by Harrington and Skrzypacz [24], we propose a new collusion enforcement scheme in a repeated game with both private monitoring and private information ...
Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and Private Monitoring
Ever since Stigler (1964), a focus of cartel theory is to explain how cartels could enforce collusive agreements given their limited ability to monitor ...
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit ...
We show that despite observing neither costs, prices, nor sales, a cartel can still enforce a collusive agreement that maximizes joint profit. When the firms ...
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Request PDF | Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring | This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, ...
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
By Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang; Abstract: This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce ...
[PDF] Collusion enforcement with private information and private ...
A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market ...
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's ...
Optimal collusion with private information
... privately informed firms to construct a self-enforcing collusive ... monitoring) or public-monitoring (e.g., Green and Porter (1984)) collusion models.
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining ...
Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information.
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information | RTI
When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to ...
Maintaining Privacy in Cartels - MIT Economics
Zhang (2015), “Collusion Enforcement with Private Information and. Private Monitoring,”Journal of Economic Theory, 157, 188-211. [21] Compte ...
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Abstract. This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive.
Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information - Khalil
When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent ...
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels
firms to truthfully share sales information in order to monitor compliance, thereby providing proper pricing incentives. ... “Optimal Collusion with Private ...
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
Request PDF | Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information | When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, ...
Collusion under Monitoring of Sales∗
In such cases, compliance with the collusive agreement is ... consider collusion when prices are private information and monitoring occurs with respect.
Private Observation, Communication and Collusion - jstor
KEYWORDS: Discounted repeated games, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring, privately observed signals, communication, antitrust law, review strategy. 1.
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
When a principal's monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent ...
Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information - CESifo
When a principal's monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information ...