- Commonly|owned firms have weaker managerial incentives🔍
- Common Ownership🔍
- Recent Studies on Common Ownership🔍
- Who's Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its ...🔍
- The Economic Costs of Common Ownership🔍
- Who's paying attention? Measuring common ownership and its ...🔍
- How Big a Problem Is It That a Few Shareholders Own Stock in So ...🔍
- A Critical Review of the Common Ownership Literature🔍
Commonly|owned firms have weaker managerial incentives
Commonly-owned firms have weaker managerial incentives
More commonly-owned firms have weaker managerial incentives, which may both reflect worse governance and reduced incentives to compete for ...
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
... firm within the same industry, those firms may have reduced incentives to compete. Firms can soften competition by raising prices, reducing ...
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
The common ownership hypothesis suggests that when large investors own shares in more than one firm within the same industry, those firms may have reduced ...
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Compared to the benchmark case of separately owned firms, a common owner has weaker economic incentives to induce competition and therefore ...
Recent Studies on Common Ownership, Firm Behavior, and Market ...
... common owner—an asset management firm—has weak incentives to govern. To make progress on the question whether common owners are good or ...
common owner has relatively weaker economic incentives to provide her manager with highly ... Either effect requires that firms' managers have incentives ...
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
They should therefore optimally structure executive pay such that managers have weakened incentives to compete aggressively against their ...
common ownership in recent years has had a ... hence, managers having weaker incentives to internalize the preferences of investors.
The Economic Costs of Common Ownership - ProMarket
Although antitrust authorities have the power to investigate and prosecute companies that collude or abuse their market power to harm consumers, ...
Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market ...
Firms that are commonly owned internalize the externalities of their actions on other commonly owned firms. These firms have weaker incentives to publicly ...
Who's paying attention? Measuring common ownership and its ...
Such common ownership could affect firms' strategic choices because common owners have an incentive to internalize how each firm's actions will affect the ...
How Big a Problem Is It That a Few Shareholders Own Stock in So ...
Horizontal shareholders maximize profits when managers have weaker incentives to increase their firm's ... commonly-held rival firms. The ...
institutional investors providing managers with weak incentives ... and self-regulating, in the sense that a firm manager would not have an ...
... has more common ownership, owners want to see weaker managerial incentives; in ... firms they own, then firms have fewer incentives to ...
Common ownership, market power, and innovation - ScienceDirect
Now it is common for large firms in any industry to have common shareholders with significant shares (see, e.g., Azar et al., 2018). Minority cross-ownership is ...
Common Ownership and its Impact on Competition - OECD
In particular, it has been theorized that institutional investors with holdings in multiple competing firms may have the incentive to dampen ...
Literature to date has considered two potential channels: managerial incentives and “doing nothing” (i.e., refraining from pushing for more aggressive ...
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives
Using panel regressions and a difference-in-differences design, we document that managerial incentives are less performance sensitive in firms with more common ...
Disturbing the Quiet Life? Competition and CEO Incentives
The business-stealing effect calls for stronger incentives because firm profitability and survival prospects are more sensitive to managerial effort in highly ...
DOES EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP ENHANCE FIRM SURVIVAL?
surplus returned to non-employee owners decreases in the employee-owned company, the owners or the managers of the company have a weaker incentive to ...