- Direct and indirect risk|taking incentives of inside debt🔍
- Direct and Indirect Risk|Taking Incentives of Inside Debt🔍
- [PDF] Direct and Indirect Risk|Taking Incentives of Inside Debt ...🔍
- Executive Equity Risk|Taking Incentives and Firm's Choice of Debt ...🔍
- [PDF] Inside Debt🔍
- Inside Debt🔍
- Does CEO debt|like compensation mitigate corporate social ...🔍
- How executive incentive design affects risk|taking🔍
Direct and indirect risk|taking incentives of inside debt
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt - ScienceDirect
We argue that not only the direct risk-taking incentives of inside debt but also their interactions with other compensation components need to be considered.
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt - IDEAS/RePEc
Abstract. We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is compensated with salary, equity and inside debt. We ...
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt | Working ...
Publications on financial institutions, financial markets, macro finance, household finance, corporate governance, systemic risk.
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt - IDEAS/RePEc
The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and different compensation components. First, we show that credit spreads are ...
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt ; Stefano Colonnello. Ca Foscari University of Venice; Halle Institute for Economic ...
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt - EconStor
We show that credit spreads are increasing in equity incentives. This relation becomes stronger as the seniority of inside debt increases. Using a sample of ...
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt - EconStor
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and ...
[PDF] Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt ...
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and ...
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt - hebis
Abstract. We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. · Research Area. Corporate Finance · Keywords. inside debt, credit ...
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt. dc.creator, Colonnello, Stefano. dc.creator, Curatola, Giuliano. dc.creator, Ngoc Giang Hoang. dc.
Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt | CoLab
We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about the relation between credit spreads and ...
Executive Equity Risk-Taking Incentives and Firm's Choice of Debt ...
Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt ... We develop a model of compensation structure and asset risk choice, where a risk-averse manager is ...
[PDF] Inside Debt - Semantic Scholar
... risk taking and executive compensation in financial institutions ... Direct and Indirect Risk-Taking Incentives of Inside Debt · Stefano ...
Inside Debt, Bank Default Risk, and Performance during the Crisis
There is considerable research that investigates how the structure of CEO compensation is associated with bank risk-taking incentives. Houston and James (1995).
Does CEO debt-like compensation mitigate corporate social ...
First, given the foregoing attributes of debt-like compensation, a CEO holding large inside debt has the incentive to mitigate corporate distress risk but may ...
How executive incentive design affects risk-taking: a literature review
... Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt. J Corp ... risk-taking incentives and the systemic risk of financial institutions.
Two Essays on CEO Inside Debt Holding in Relation to Firm Payout ...
incentives on corporate risk taking behavior. Our results show that firms change their risk taking behavior when inside debt deviates from the optimal level.
Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts - PubsOnLine
Theory posits that managerial holdings of debt (“inside debt”) align managers' incentives with those of outside debtholders.
Differential risk effect of inside debt, CEO compensation ...
We find a strong positive association between the inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) of CEOs and announcement‐ ...
DOES INSIDE DEBT MODERATE CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE?
Finally, besides the direct and indirect costs to the firm, failed tax planning can also aggravate financial distress risk.10 If the costs of tax avoidance are ...