Dual Ownership and Risk|Taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial ...

This article studies how the three-way interaction among shareholders, creditors, and managers shapes firms' executive compensation.

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial ...

This paper studies how the three-way interaction among shareholders, creditors, and managers shapes firms' executive compensation.

Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Such investors are dubbed “dual holders. For these dual holders, their objective is to maximize the total value of their portfolio debt and equity. Compared to ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Firms with a higher ownership share by “dual holders”—institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the company—adopt a less risk-inducing ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Download Citation | Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation | This article studies how the three-way ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial ...

This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large ownership held by dual holders, ...

Dual ownership and risk-taking incentives in managerial ... - EconBiz

Dual ownership and risk-taking incentives in managerial compensation ; Published in: Review of finance : journal of the European Finance Association. - Oxford : ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Download Citation | On Jan 1, 2019, Tao Chen and others published Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation | Find, read and cite ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial ... - CoLab

... risk-inducing compensation structure: less stock options and more inside debt. Exploiting financial institution mergers that increase or decrease dual ownership ...

Full article: Do dual holders enhance or hinder managerial efficiency?

Notably, the results highlight significant negative correlations between measures of dual ownership (DUAL and DUAL_OWN) and indicators of ...

Review of Finance on LinkedIn: Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking ...

'Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation' by Tao CHEN, Li Zhang, Qifei Zhu is now available in Review of ...

[PDF] Dual Ownership and Managerial Compensation Incentives ...

2019. This paper analyzes the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on corporate risk-taking. In particular, I examine the role played by institutional dual- ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation. Date：2022-11-02. Speaker: Tao Chen. Speaker Intro: Tao Chen is an Associate Professor in ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial ... - CoLab

This paper studies how managerial compensation is shaped by the risk preference of shareholders. Firms with a large ownership held by holders'' ...

Dual Ownership and Managerial Compensation Incentives

Therefore, shareholders may need to award equity-based compensation, especially stock options, to managers in order to induce risk-taking (Guay ...

Institutional dual holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from corporate ...

By analyzing the extent to which a firm is owned by such dual-holders, I can identify the impact of shareholder-creditor conflicts on corporate risk-taking ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial ...

Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation. Economics · Political Science · Finance. Show More. Authors. Tao Chen,Li Zhang. ,Qifei Zhu.

Managerial incentives to take asset risk - ScienceDirect.com

The notion that such asset risk taking incentives emanate also from straight equity ownership does not contradict or make less relevant the idea that stock ...

Managerial incentives and risk-taking

Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that ...

CEO Incentives for Risk-Taking and Compensation Duration

(2006); Peng and Röell (2014); and Edmans et al. (2012) generally prescribe longer vesting schedules to align manager and shareholder preferences more closely.