Electoral Rules and Corruption
Electoral Rules and Corruption
We expect corruption to be higher in less democratic regimes (a higher value of. POLRIGHT), since the voters find it harder to remove corrupt leaders and to.
ELECTORAL RULES AND CORRUPTION - Oxford Academic
Consistent with the theoretical hypothesis on the ballot structure, corruption is higher the larger is the fraction of candidates elected on party lists. The ...
Electoral Rules and Corruption | Journal of the European Economic ...
Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth. ” International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 99/85, July.
Electoral Rules and Corruption - IDEAS/RePEc
We find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from ...
Electoral Rules and Corruption* - CiteSeerX
... electoral rules on corruption de- pending on the cultural or historical ... One is reverse causation: for instance, corrupt politicians might deliberately choose.
Electoral Rules and Corruption - Search eLibrary :: SSRN
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, ...
Electoral Rules and Corruption | NBER
We find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from ...
(PDF) Electoral Rules and Corruption - ResearchGate
Larger voting districts-and thus lower barriers to entry-are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists-and ...
Electoral rules, corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy
European Journal of Political Research 56: 469–486, 2017. 469 doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12188. Electoral rules, corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy.
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND CORRUPTION
This paper investigates how different electoral rules influence political corruption. We argue that closed-list proportional representation systems are most ...
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as - jstor
systems. Page 7. Electoral Rules as Constraints on Corruption 579. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MONITORING CORRUPT POLITICAL ...
Electoral Rules and Corruption - IDEAS/RePEc
Larger voting districts-and thus lower barriers to entry-are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists-and ...
Electoral Systems and Corruption - SciELO Bolivia
... corruption level, less corrupt parties will be chosen under all electoral rules. He considers the case where there are four parties L1, L2, R1, R2 where L ...
Effects of Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Corruption on ...
A higher level of corruption distorts the expenditure structure: corrupt civil servants favour investments in building and creation projects rather than ...
Party systems, electoral systems and constraints on corruption
This article explores the relationship between the party system, electoral formulas and corruption. Previous research has focused on the various incentives ...
Electoral rules, corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy
However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity ...
Topic Guide: Electoral Corruption
Election rigging, on the other hand, consists in manipulating electoral outcomes through corrupt practices such as ballot-stuffing, misinforming voters, mis- ...
The Causal Impact of the Electoral System on Corruption - CESifo
We estimate the causal effect of the electoral system on corruption by leveraging a specificity of the French electoral law where the electoral system for ...
Electoral Systems, Competition, and Incentives for Corruption
Again, institutions that lower competition and district size increase incentives for challengers to expose corrupt politicians, lowering political corruption.
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on ...
In this chapter, we focus on the second of these two functions and investigate how different electoral systems constrain corrupt rent-seeking.