Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable

Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable by Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock and Frederic Vermeulen. Published in volume 107, ...

Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable - jstor

Section IV concludes. I. Stable Marriage. We consider an empirical analyst who observes a set of matched (married) house- holds with ...

Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable | IZA

IZA DP No. 8070: Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable ... We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market ...

Household consumption when the marriage is stable

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption. We define a revealed preference ...

Household Consumption when the Marriage is Stable

Starting from a set of consumption observations for dif- ferent households, we assume stable marriage in addition to Pareto effi cient household consumption.

Household consumption when the marriage is stable

Household consumption when the marriage is stable. Laurens Cherchye. Thomas Demuynck. Bram De Rock. Frederic Vermeulen. Appendix A: A necessary and suffi cient ...

Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable - IDEAS/RePEc

Downloadable! We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for house-hold consumption patterns.

Replication data for: Household Consumption When the Marriage Is ...

Cherchye, Laurens, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock, and Frederic Vermeulen. “Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable.” American Economic Review 107, no.

Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable

We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption patterns.

Household consumption when marriage is stable - EconStor

We define a revealed preference characterization of efficient household consumption when the marriage is stable. Stability means that the marriage matching is ...

Household consumption when marriage is stable

This paper develops a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of the marriage market for household consumption.

Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable - EconPapers

By Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck, Bram De Rock and Frederic Vermeulen; Abstract: We develop a novel framework to analyze the structural implications of ...

Household consumption when the marriage is stable

We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference characterization ...

Household Consumption When the Marriage is Stable - ResearchGate

... Dream data are wonderful in principle but in practice hard to come by. Data that are relatively close to such dream data have been used by Cherchye et al. ( ...

Household Consumption When the Marriage Is Stable - Ex Libris

We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference characterization ...

Stable marriage, household consumption and unobserved match ...

Abstract. We present a methodology for the structural empirical analysis of house- hold consumption and time use behaviour under marital stability. Our ap-.

Household consumption when the marriage is stable

We characterize stable marriage with intrahousehold (consumption) transfers but without assuming transferable utility. Our revealed preference ...

DP16483 Stable marriage, household consumption and unobserved ...

We present a methodology for the structural empirical analysis of household consumption and time use behaviour under marital stability.

Stable Marriage, Household Consumption and Unobserved Match ...

Our approach requires a cross-section of households (married couples and sin- gles) and their expenditure and time use allocations. We specify observable pref-.

Household consumption when the marriage is stable - ULB

Keywords: marriage market, stable matching, Pareto effi cient household consumption, testable implications, sharing rule identification, preference ...