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Mechanism Design and Intentions∗


Mechanism Design and Intentions - coll.mpg.de

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Psychological Games, Social Preferences, Reciprocity. JEL Classification: C70, C72, D02, D03, D82, D86. ∗Email: [email protected] ...

Mechanism Design and Intentions∗

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Psychological Games, Social Preferences, Intentions,. Reciprocity, Revelation Principle. JEL Classification: C70, C72, D02, D03, D82 ...

Mechanism design and intentions - EconStor

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Psychological Games, Social Preferences, Reciprocity. JEL Classification: C70, C72, D02, D03, D82, D86. ∗Email: [email protected] ...

Mechanism Design and Intentions∗ - CMR

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Psychological Games, Social Preferences, Intentions,. Reciprocity, Revelation Principle. JEL Classification: C70, C72, D02, D03, D82 ...

[PDF] Mechanism Design and Intentions | Semantic Scholar

Intentions and Ex-Post Implementation ∗ · N. NetzerAndré Volk. Economics. 2014. Intention-based reciprocity is an important motivation for human behavior, and ...

Mechanism Design and Intentions - IDEAS/RePEc

Downloadable! We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of ...

[PDF] Mechanism Design and Intentions - Semantic Scholar

Intentions and Ex-Post Implementation ∗ · N. NetzerAndré Volk. Economics. 2014. Intention-based reciprocity is an important motivation for human behavior, and ...

Mechanism Design and Intentions by Felix Bierbrauer, Nick Netzer

We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that differ with respect to what is ...

Mechanism design - Wikipedia

Mechanism design, sometimes called implementation theory or institution design, is a branch of economics, social choice, and game theory that deals with ...

Mechanism design and intentions - EconPapers - RePEc

By Felix Bierbrauer and Nick Netzer; Abstract: We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that ...

Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences∗ - Cerge - Ei

Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences∗ ... mechanism for selfish agents and the optimal ... Mechanism design and intentions. Unpublished ...

Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information - EliScholar

state their intention to “study the class of social choice functions f from Θ into X ... g∗(φg∗ (θ)) = f(θ) for any θ in Θ and φg∗ (θ) = θ. The ...

Privacy and Mechanism Design - UPenn CIS

in any such setting, the VCG mechanism can implement the outcome o∗ which exactly maximizes ... intention of then running an auction to ...

Mechanism Design with Partially Veri able Information

∗Contact details: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, strauszr@hu ... state their intention to “study the class of social choice functions f from Θ ...

Empirical mechanism design: Methods, with application to a supply ...

... ∗∗. = arg max. Θ\θ. ∗. W (s. ∗. (θ ), θ). Suppose w.l.o.g. that θ. ∗∗. is also ... intentions. At the algorithm's core is a deep reinforcement learning ...

Mechanism design and intentions - Zora.uzh.ch - Universität Zürich

Mechanism design and intentions. Journal of Economic Theory, 163:557-603. Abstract. We introduce intention-based social preferences into ...

(Mechanism Design | Mailath Exercise 10.5.3) A Question

Let (q(θ),p(θ)) be the mechanism. Let us show that the optimal mechanism will define a cutoff θ∗ such that q(θ)=1 and p(θ)=θ∗ if and only if ...

Mechanism Design and Intentions by Felix Bierbrauer, Nick Netzer

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs.

Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences∗

Mechanism design and intentions. University of Zurich,. Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 66. Bohnet, I., Hermann, G., and Zeckhauser, R. (2008) ...

Incentive Mechanism Design Toward a Win–Win Situation ...

DUAN et al.: INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN TOWARD A WIN–WIN SITUATION. 3 model. This intention is similar to data crowdsourcing [11], ... j , e∗ j ) jth winner's ...