- Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design🔍
- "Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design".🔍
- Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design ...🔍
- Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring🔍
- Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion 🔍
- The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law🔍
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions🔍
- Optimal collusion with private information🔍
Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design ...
Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design
Downloadable! This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and ...
Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design
Munich Personal RePEc Archive. Private Enforcement against Collusion in. Mechanism Design. Chen, Zhijun. School of Economics, Zhejiang ...
"Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design".
This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer.
Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design
By Zhijun Chen; Abstract: This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the.
(PDF) Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design
PDF | This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer.
Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design ...
Abstract. This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer.
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features are broadly consistent with common cartel practice identified by Harrington ...
Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion
P's return from q is denoted by V (q) which is increasing on Q, with V (0) = 0. The realization of θ is privately observed by. A. 2, which denotes the support ...
The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law
of private enforcement through litigation is partly a consequence of. America's earliest regulatory design, which relied largely on com- mon law for the ...
Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions - Zhang - 2022
... collusion in auctions has focused on the issue of soliciting private information about valuations. ... In the standard setup of mechanism-design ...
Optimal collusion with private information
The on-schedule incentive constraints are reminiscent of truth-telling constraints in standard mechanism design theory, with continuation values playing the ...
The Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement Systems
Designing a competition system that will secure 'optimal' deterrence and compensation will depend on each jurisdiction's characteristics.1 One ...
Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation
Abstract. When firms collude and charge supracompetitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, ...
Private Enforcement, Corruption, and Antitrust Design | Request PDF
The social welfare effect of enabling private antitrust enforcement in the presence of corruption depends on whether corrupt officials in the ensuing bribery ...
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
design literature. 2From Jan 1, 2024 to Feb 5, 2024, there are 256595 blocks have been produced on Ethereum, and 5840 blocks.
Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement
... collusion, they focus on tacit collusion because “explicit form of collusion using smart contracts is easy to detect and can be forbidden by ...
Redundant Public-Private Enforcement - Scholarship@Cornell Law
Redundant enforcement also is noticeably underrepresented in the substantial literature on private and public enforcement, which typically treats government ...
Regulating Collusion - Annual Reviews
of mechanism design, industrial organization, and legal analysis. ... On antitrust enforcement and the deterrence of collusive behaviour.
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
Beyond auctions, problems of mechanism design by privately involved parties are prevalent in economics, from bilateral or multilateral trade with an informed ...
On the contributions of auction design as a supplement to antitrust enforcement in deterring collusion, see Klemperer (2002); Marshall and Meurer (2004; 110–117) ...