Events2Join

Transparency in sequential common|value trade


Transparency in sequential common-value trade - AWS

Transparency in sequential common-value trade. Andre Speit and Justus Preusser. EEA-ESEM 2023. Page 2. Introduction. • Consider a decentralized market for a ...

Transparency in Sequential Common-Value Trade - IDEAS/RePEc

We consider the sale of a single indivisible common-value good in a dynamic market where short-lived buyers arrive over time.

Transparency in Sequential Common-Value Trade - CRC TR 224

Transparency in Sequential Common-Value Trade✯. Justus Preusser❸. Andre Speit❹. This version: November 18, 2022. Abstract. We consider the sale of a single ...

Repeated Trading: Transparency and Market Structure

Often, in such markets sellers may be privately informed about the value they provide and may lack the ability to credibly communicate it. This ...

Market Transparency | Secondary Markets | ICMA

Trade transparency allows market participants to make better, informed decisions. From an academic perspective, transparency can increase the efficiency of the ...

Pre-Trade Transparency and Informed Trading An Experimental ...

liquidation value is common knowledge to all traders and known before trading starts. In the middle of the trading period (t=180 sec), we release public ...

The impact of reduced pre-trade transparency regimes on market ...

Our agent-based numerical experiments suggest that full quote transparency incurs substantial transaction costs to traders and dampens trading activity in an ...

Transparency in fragmented markets: Experimental evidence

These 16 se- curities differ in their true value and trading environment (i.e., market type and signal dispersion). The list of securities is ...

Repeated Trading: Transparency and Market Structure

We analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed ...

Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency

transparent organization depends on the trade-off between the observa- ... "Information Sharing in Common Agency: When Is. Transparency Good ...

Platform

Information and Markets. Score Disclosure - (Theory). Mikhail Drugov. Transparency in Sequential Common-Value Trade - (Theory). Justus Preusser. Responsible ...

Trade reporting: Transparent Transactions under the Order ...

4. Tips for ensuring transparency in transactions include using electronic trading platforms that provide real-time reporting of trades, ...

The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with ...

Auction-house guarantees are becoming a common feature in the art market. ... market value. It is noted that the most liquid assets, which ...

Valuation & transparency - Risk.net

Whether marking to market or projecting the price or value of new products, the enabling technology is now firmly embedded in the plans and strategies of ...

Transparent Value Alignment - DSpace@MIT

While human objectives and values can be represented in a va- riety of ways, reward functions are a common representation in the value alignment ...

The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with ...

Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's transparency, ...

Security Prices and Market Transparency (Revision of 12-90)

This effect tends to widen the deviation between the market clearing price and the conditional expected value ... Stokey, 1982, "Information, Trade, and Common ...

An empirical study on pre-trade transparency and intraday stealth ...

Additionally, Ma et al. (2008) utilized the data of Taiwan stock market to indicate that greater pre-trade transparency intensifies aggressiveness in order ...

Pre-Trade Opacity, Informed Trading, and Market Quality - NYU Stern

common factor models, Journal of Financial Markets 5, 309-321. ... (NFILDHidden!) are the trade-value weighted proportion of liquidity-supplying ( ...

Should First-Price Auctions be Transparent? - Yale University

We interpret these findings as consistent with the common wisdom that more transparency ... Jamison (2008): “Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically.