- Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case🔍
- Federal Antitrust Crime🔍
- Collusion with Private Information and Fixed Costs🔍
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring🔍
- LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS🔍
- The Law and economics of list price collusion🔍
- INFORMATION SHARING🔍
- Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels🔍
Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
... monitoring, and meetings in equilibrium" - all features of the Sugar Institute. In their recent paper on price collusion with private information, Athey et al.
Buy-backs, Price Wars, and Collusion Enforcement - CiteSeerX
Recent studies of cartel operation show that in most cartels both sales and price data were private information, and side payments between firms.
Federal Antitrust Crime: A Primer for Law Enforcement Personnel
When the federal government or its agencies are victims of antitrust crime, the Department of Justice may obtain treble damages. In addition, private parties ( ...
Collusion with Private Information and Fixed Costs - Royal Holloway
A subset of them discuss various aspects of public monitoring and analyze its role in enforcing collusion. We discuss some of these papers later in the ...
Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
The purpose of the paper is to clarify the possibility that players can make self-enforcing collusive agreements even if their private monitoring is far from ...
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
that monitor information in fIles and amend the information when inaccuracies ... and private police to share information on crimes, criminals, and crime-.
The Law and economics of list price collusion
4 Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang, Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring, 157 J. ECON. THEORY 188, 188-. 211 (2015). 5 Joseph E ...
... private monitoring,”. Econometrica, 66, 597–626. Cramton, P. C. and T. R. Palfrey (1990), “Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs,”.
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels - ProQuest
firms to truthfully share sales information in order to monitor compliance, thereby providing proper pricing incentives. ... “Optimal Collusion with Private ...
What do Firms Say When Colluding? Evidence from Past Antitrust ...
verifiable private information in order to facilitate the collusion, Awaya and Krishna ... “Cheap Talk, Monitoring, and Collusion”. 2020 ...
Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism
In contrast, tacit coordination involves situations where firms do not communicate privately to exchange information. From a legal perspective, tacit collusion ...
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels
Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions ...
Financial Surveillance in the United States
Americans' private financial information to federal law enforcement without legal process.7 In the months that followed this initial request ...
Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development ...
This endeavor demands a society-wide effort that includes government, the private sector, academia, and civil society. My Administration places ...
AI and Algorithmic Pricing: Current Issues and Compliance ...
Compliance Considerations and Monitoring Developments. With increased scrutiny from antitrust enforcers, as well as private plaintiffs ...
SB-1154 California Preventing Algorithmic Collusion Act of 2024 ...
... private equity firms or strategic buyers, with a focus on monitoring and enforcing potentially anticompetitive roll-ups. Consideration of ...
Address Algorithmic Collusion with Compliance by Design - ProMarket
More controversially, it also crunches private information on nearby rival rents. ... Firms must stabilize collusion by monitoring ...
Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly* - Duke People
Costs are private information. At each period, the firm with the ... First, instead of private monitoring, Schenone's game is one of perfect monitoring.
Algorithms and Collusion - Background Note by the Secretariat
monitoring competitors' actions in order to enforce a collusive agreement. ... actions and treble damages that could result from private antitrust ...
Achieving Collusion Through Vertical Exchange of Information
9 Kaplow, supra note 1, at 685. 10 Section 4 of the Clayton Act supplements the public enforcement sanctions by providing an incentive for private enforcement ...